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THE US POLICY PITFALLS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE RESURGENCE OF THE TALIBAN

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07 Pages : 76‐85

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-II).07      10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-II).07      Published : Jun 2024

The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban

Abstract

    The US stayed in Afghanistan for two decades, but the Taliban's insurgency didn't decrease. Instead, each year, the Taliban grew stronger against the both National forces. Notably, the dysfunctions experienced under Republican governments, as well as the coercive tactics employed by US and Afghan national forces, such as night raids, unlawful detentions, cum with bribery, unemployment, poverty, nepotism in both public and private spheres, and rampant injustice, furthered the frustration among Afghan citizens. As a result, many Afghans, driven by their frustration, joined the Taliban against both the US, Afghan national forces, and republican governments to reclaim their due rights and outpour the aggression. Under these circumstances, the Taliban strategically capitalized on a range of persuasive tactics to entice and captivate the Afghans. The multifaceted approach played a significant role in drawing these individuals towards the Taliban's cause and cementing their allegiance in the face of mounting frustrations and grievances.

    Trauma, Afghans, Frustration, Taliban, Aggression, Coercion, Detentions, Corruption, Injustice

    (1) Deedar Karim
    Research Associate, South Asia Times (SAT), Islamabad, Pakistan.
    (2) Jawad Jabbar
    Parliamentary Associate, Parliament of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

    APA : Karim, D., & Jabbar, J. (2024). The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban. Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX(II), 76‐85. https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-II).07

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Karim, Deedar, and Jawad Jabbar. 2024. "The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX (II): 76‐85 doi: 10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-II).07

HARVARD

    HARVARD : KARIM, D. & JABBAR, J. 2024. The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban. Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX, 76‐85.

MHRA

    MHRA : Karim, Deedar, and Jawad Jabbar. 2024. "The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX: 76‐85

MLA

    MLA : Karim, Deedar, and Jawad Jabbar. "The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX.II (2024): 76‐85 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Karim, Deedar and Jabbar, Jawad (2024), "The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban", Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX (II), 76‐85

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Karim, Deedar, and Jawad Jabbar. "The US Policy Pitfalls in Afghanistan and Their Impacts on the Resurgence of the Taliban." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review IX, no. II (2024): 76‐85. https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-II).07