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THE EXPANSION OF THE INSURGENCY IN THE ERSTWHILE TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN

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14 Pages : 138-148

http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2021(VI-II).14      10.31703/gsssr.2021(VI-II).14      Published : Jun 2021

The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan

Abstract

    The incident of 9/11 and its aftereffects profoundly affected the security situation in Pakistan. The US and NATO forces invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 led many Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives to take refuge in the erstwhile tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistan army conducted military operations against the militants, but militancy initially confined to the South Waziristan expanded to the rest of the tribal areas. The question of insurgency expansion has been discussed by various scholars, but this study advances a different explanation. Firstly, the military operations were not supported by an effective counter narrative against the insurgents. Secondly, the military operations were conducted in the area of limited statehood, which helped the insurgents to obtain the support of the people and contributed to the expansion of insurgency. This study enhances our understanding of insurgency expansion in the tribal areas and contributes to the existing literature by providing a different explanation.

    Insurgency, Tribal Areas, Military Operations, Expansion

    (1) Alamgir Khan
    Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Swabi, Swabi, KP, Pakistan.
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APA

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Khan, Alamgir. 2021. "The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VI (II): 138-148 doi: 10.31703/gsssr.2021(VI-II).14

HARVARD

    HARVARD : KHAN, A. 2021. The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VI, 138-148.

MHRA

    MHRA : Khan, Alamgir. 2021. "The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VI: 138-148

MLA

    MLA : Khan, Alamgir. "The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VI.II (2021): 138-148 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Khan, Alamgir (2021), "The Expansion of the Insurgency in the Erstwhile Tribal Areas of Pakistan", Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VI (II), 138-148

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