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MAJOR POWERS RIVALRIES ANALYSIS OF WAR CHOICE OR COMPULSION

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http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-IV).02      10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-IV).02      Published : Dec 2022

Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)

Abstract

    History is consistent with a pattern of the rise and fall of great empires that have dominated the international landscape, but the last five hundred years have simplified an irrefutable arrangement of the rise and fall of great empires. This study explores the rise of China in a historical context and vindicates the hypothetical and theoretical probability of war by using the Thucydides trap in the transition of power from an existing superpower to emerging power. Our results explore that war between the great powers is not a trap created by structural stresses of the international anarchic system, so war is a rational choice for pursuing the strategic goal.

    Thucydides Trap, China, U.S, Peaceful Rise, Militarized Conflict, Superpower, Great Power Rivalry.

    (1) Zeeshan Ahmad
    BS Student, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan.
    (2) Ijaz Khalid
    ssistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan.
    (3) Maghfoor Ullah
    BS Student, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, KP, Pakistan.
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Cite this article

APA

CHICAGO

    CHICAGO : Ahmad, Zeeshan, Ijaz Khalid, and Maghfoor Ullah. 2022. "Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VII (IV): 8-16 doi: 10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-IV).02

HARVARD

    HARVARD : AHMAD, Z., KHALID, I. & ULLAH, M. 2022. Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion). Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VII, 8-16 .

MHRA

    MHRA : Ahmad, Zeeshan, Ijaz Khalid, and Maghfoor Ullah. 2022. "Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VII: 8-16

MLA

    MLA : Ahmad, Zeeshan, Ijaz Khalid, and Maghfoor Ullah. "Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VII.IV (2022): 8-16 Print.

OXFORD

    OXFORD : Ahmad, Zeeshan, Khalid, Ijaz, and Ullah, Maghfoor (2022), "Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)", Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, VII (IV), 8-16

TURABIAN

    TURABIAN : Ahmad, Zeeshan, Ijaz Khalid, and Maghfoor Ullah. "Major Powers Rivalries: Analysis of War (Choice or Compulsion)." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review VII, no. IV (2022): 8-16 . https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2022(VII-IV).02