Abstract

The arrival of nuclear weapons was detrimental in changing the nature of warfare; during WWII, we used nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities. The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons made the pioneers apprehensive about the spread of nuclear technology across the globe. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) is a set of international rules, norms, initiatives, agreements, arrangements, bilateral and multilateral treaties to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of NNPR. This paper discusses the significance of NNPR and will focus on how Pakistan fits into the bigger picture of the NNPR as a nuclear state. This research study will further analyze the prospects and challenges for Pakistan viz a viz the NNPR. It will specifically focus on Pakistan's official position on joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and the two relevant Export Control Regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime). Moreover, the challenges Pakistan faces viz-a-viz these treaties and arrangements will be highlighted. Recommendations will be provided based on the prospects of how Pakistan can overcome these challenges.

Key Words

Pakistan, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR), Missile Technology Control Regime

Introduction

The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) refers to the voluntary arrangements, treaties, and informal cartels at the international level that curbs the spread of nuclear weapons.  The backbone of the NNPR is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was drafted and joined by the states to do general and complete nuclear disarmament and arms control. Furthermore, the NPT is a multilateral arrangement designed to forestall nuclear weapons, the technology related to nuclear technology, and promote peace. 

All the major powers that developed

Before the NPT was entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons were known as the de-jure nuclear weapon states. The five states that have joined the NPT as nuclear states include the United States, China, Britain, Russia, France, and China. All these states have developed nuclear weapons before the 1970s; the states that have made nuclear weapons after that are known as the de-facto nuclear weapon states; as the NPT does not accept their nuclear status, this is why they have not signed the NPT yet. Pakistan is among those four atomic weapon states that remain outside the NPT, including India, Israel, and North Korea. While the nuclear programs of India and Israel have got acceptance at the international level (CFR, 2012), Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear programs are seen with skepticism and draw criticism from the West particularly.  Out of these four NPT outlier states, North Korea is the only state that initially joined the NPT as a member state but withdrew its membership in 2003 to pursue a nuclear weapons program. 




The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime - Overview 

The nuclear nonproliferation regime can be best explained via the above-drawn figure. This can also be called a mind map of the NNPR, which comprises the multilateral treaties, norms, conventions, agreements, and verification mechanism. All these norms have aimed to halt the spreading of nuclear technology that can be sued for making weapons and to promote the civilian use of nuclear technology.

The NPT is among the significant multilateral treaties that maximum states have joined at the international level. The status of universality has not yet been achieved (Miller & Scheinman, 2003) as the four nuclear-capable states remain outside NPT. The CTBT is also a treaty that has not yet been ratified by leading powers such as the US. Another important treaty is the FMCT; the negotiations on this have been going on at the international level since 1995 (Kimball & Reif, 2018). 


Figure


 
The Export Control Regimes (ECRs) are informal cartels that support the international treaties and agreements on nuclear nonproliferation. These include the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formulated in 1957, and the idea was picked up from the Atoms for Peace address delivered to the UN general assembly by the US President Eisenhower in 1953(IAEA, n.d.). It works as an international agency that the UN has entrusted to promote nuclear technology's peaceful side; it is also responsible for verifying that member states are not involved in nuclear proliferation or building up of nuclear weapons.  The IAEA is the main body that has a verification mechanism. The foremost function of IAEA is to verify that the states that have got access to nuclear materials and technology after signing a safeguards agreement with the Agency are not diverting nuclear materials and technology for making weapons and for military use. 
Norms can be divided into two main types. Legal norms and political norms, legal norms are legally binding after any state signs a treaty, agreement, or becomes part of an international convention. The political norms are moral; this means that there is no legal sanction if states violate political norms. The most accepted norm at the international level regarding nuclear weapons is that the states should not possess these Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e., the minimum number of states should possess nuclear weapons or use nuclear weapons technology for making weapons. Another universal norm is that the spreading of nuclear weapons will be counterproductive for regional and global peace and stability. The most recent example of accepting nuclear nonproliferation norms can be given by the massive number of votes cast in favor of the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW) treaty during 2020. TPNW calls upon the nuclear-armed states to take steps for the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons; however, it was rejected by the nuclear weapons possessor (P5) states. The researchers have analyzed the nuclear ban treaty as an impactful intentional treaty that will strengthen the nuclear disarmament norms (Gibbons, 2020). 
Ensuring the security and safety of nuclear materials and weapons is also one of the essential segments of NNPR. The major international conventions related to this include Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), aimed at making the nuclear power plant used for civilian purposes are safe for civilians. The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is a legally binding convention that focuses on the physical protection of nuclear material used for civilian purposes.  

Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Pakistan's nuclear program started during the 1950s (Sattar, 2010, p-125). Initially, Pakistan wanted to master using atomic energy for peaceful/ civilian purposes. However, Pakistan had to pursue its nuclear weapons program after India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974; it became inevitable for Pakistan to make nuclear weapons for maintaining the balance of terror in the region. Pakistan's quest for making nuclear weapons started during the 1970s (CTBTO, n.d.), i.e., after the wars of 1965 and 1971 between India and Pakistan, the policymakers analyzed that possessing nuclear weapons will fill out the gap of conventional asymmetry between both states (Sattar, 2010). It is interesting to note that the US accepted India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (1974), but its nuclear nonproliferation agenda was fixated on Pakistan. 

Pakistan's atomic program began with obtaining technical expertise directing research and development in the newly discovered field of nuclear energy during the 1960s. Under the Atoms for Peace program of the United States (Altaf, 2016), scientists and technicians from across the world were trained to harness nuclear technology usage for peaceful purposes. In Pakistan, foreign qualified scientists such as Dr. Rafi Muhammad Chaudhry, Dr. Ishrat Hussain Hashmi, and Dr. Abdus Salam played a considerable role in building up an infrastructure that laid the foundation of R&D in nuclear sciences. 

Pakistan tested nuclear weapons for the first time on May 28, 1998. In response to the second round of nuclear tests conducted by India on May 12 and 13, 1998, Pakistan tested five underground nuclear tests named Chagai - I on May 28, and later a single nuclear device was tested on May 30, 1998; this test is called Chagai-II (CTBTO, n.d.). Pakistan is estimated to possess a nuclear inventory of around 160 nuclear warheads (SIPRI Yearbook, 2020). According to the estimates provided by the experts, it was claimed that Pakistan has fissile material that can be enough for making approximately 350 nuclear warheads. However, the number of exact warheads or the quantity of fissile material has never been disclosed by Pakistan (Salik, 2016). 

Pakistan's atomic program has mainly been dependent on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) as the fissile material, advancing using gas rotator innovation. Later it set up a devoted atomic reactor and a reprocessing plant to make plutonium for weapons. Assessments show that it might have procured uranium and plutonium adequate for almost 80 atomic weapons until further notice. According to estimates, as of the year 2015, Pakistan possesses 0.17 (mt) plutonium and 3.1 (mt) of Highly Enriched Uranium (Global Nuclear Fissile Material Report, 2015: Salik, 2016). 




Pakistan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

When the NPT was being negotiated, Pakistan was hopeful that it would be a game-changer for the states across the globe. The state of Pakistan provided its complete support to the United Nations for the early conclusion of the NPT. However, the NPT asked for positive and negative guarantees from the states, including a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against the states that have not developed their nuclear weapons. It also binds the member states to provide security assurances to their allies that do not have nuclear weapons. This part of NPT where the nuclear weapons states were supposed to do general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons was assessed by Pakistani Policymakers to be less assuring. This is why Pakistan has maintained the official position of not signing the NPT until India signs it first. 

The NPT has three main objectives: a) nuclear disarmament, b) arms control, and c) nuclear trade for civilian use (Pilat & Busch, 2015). The NPT lacks the achievement over the objective of nuclear disarmament, and there has been no significant progress in this regard. However, the treaty effectively limited the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the issues regarding vertical proliferation remain intact. May 1995 is the point at which the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was expanded for an indefinite period, and it raised concerns that atomic weapon states may never support their commitment to wipe out their atomic weapons.

According to academicians, researchers, and authorities of Pakistan, the NPT is considered a discriminatory treaty. In 2015 then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry was asked if Pakistan would sign the NPT if pressure came from the US; this Mr. Aizaz Ahmad reacted by saying, "It is an unfair arrangement. Pakistan has the privilege to shield itself from the damage of other atomic dangers, so Pakistan will not sign NPT if India did as such" (Iqbal, 2015). Another stance that Pakistan has taken over the years is that it would join the NPT if Pakistan is accepted as a nuclear power state (Kimball & Davenport, 2017). It is evident from various official statements which Pakistan has made at the international forums that it is yet not ready to be part of the NPT. 

The NPT as the cornerstone of NNPR efforts can be compared to a water glass that is half empty and half full. The main reason it is half empty is that the P5 states have ensured to keep their monopoly over nuclear weapons (Sultan, 2018). On the one hand, the US and West have turned a blind eye to the technological advancements taking place in India and Israel's nuclear program. On the other hand, they have been promoting the perspective that two out of the four outliers' states of the NPT, i.e., Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear program, need to be managed as their programs are viewed as the chief obstacle in the effective functioning of the NNPR. This opinion regarding Pakistan's nuclear program needs to be changed. 

Whether Pakistan should sign the NPT or not has been debated over the years. The pro -NPT camp inside Pakistan suggests that Pakistan sign the NPT and give up its nuclear status to gain military and economic benefits (Khan, 2012). This group believes that Pakistan can improve its image compared to India in the international community. The other school of thought is predominantly against signing the NPT and emphasizes the significant role of nuclear deterrence in maintaining the balance of power in South Asia. Pakistan must keep its security and strategic interests in mind before signing the NPT and giving up its nuclear weapon status.




Pakistan and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 

Conference on Disarmament (CD) under the sponsorship of United Nations is the only forum at the international system (that works with consensus) where various treaties, agreements, initiatives regarding nuclear proliferation, arms control, and disarmament can be negotiated (Jaspal, 2010).

Pakistan has been supportive of starting negotiations over the FMCT since 1993; however, its stance on FMCT is that the treaty should be inclusive of existing fissile material stockpiles of the nuclear states. Due to this stand taken by Pakistan, it is believed by the international community that Pakistan alone has hindered further negotiations on the FMCT since 2010. Another opinion is that Pakistan has been blocking the beginning of negotiations/consensus over FMCT at the CD that consists of 65 states (Kimball, 2020). 

The FMCT would boycott the creation of

fissile materials for making weapons in the future; for example, it will permanently ban the new production of plutonium and uranium/HEU used in making atomic weapons. Pakistan has ended these exchanges despite the acknowledgment of FMCT in the work program for the Conference of Disarmament (CD). Pakistan has fewer fissile material stocks than and demands that all the existing stocks and fissile material dump be tended to as a component of any discussions (Kimball & Reif, 2018). Pakistan has additionally raised concerns over the implications of the US-Indian nuclear deal. Moreover, Pakistan expects to create and move from bigger and heavier to lighter HEU-based atomic weapons (Mian & Nayyar, 2010). Pakistan likewise took an inconclusive position towards a potential FMCT because it was clearly stated in the December 1993 UN General Assembly Resolution that such as treaty should be concluded, which is "non-prejudicial, multilateral and globally powerful deal that aims at halting the steady creation of fissile material for any sort of atomic arms or gadgets" (Kimball, 2020). At CD's forum, Pakistan has been delaying initiating the negotiations over FMCT. The main argument given by Pakistan is that the scope of the proposed FMCT must include all the existing fissile material stockpiles (Kimball & Reif, 2018). 

FMCT is still in the process of concluding a draft, and it is still in the process of negotiations. Since May 2009, Pakistan has maintained its official position on FMCT, i.e., it has demanded to start negotiation on the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), which must include all the existing material fissile stockpiles along with the future stocks. If only the future production is banned under the FMCT, it will prove detrimental in maintaining the balance of power in South Asia as the asymmetry between Pakistan and India will increase (Akram, 2009). 

Some researchers and academicians in Pakistan believe that blocking negotiations over the FMCT at the CD Pakistan has been taking the backlash for all the states that agree with Pakistan and are officially silent about opposing the FMCT (Mian & Nayyar, 2010). Such states have been taking cover under Pakistan's shadow as they refused to allow talks over FMCT. An interesting turn of events can be seen if Pakistan permits further talks over FMCT; this will put India and other states with a rigid stance over disarmament under the spotlight. 

Pakistan and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Conference of Disarmament (CD), a 65- nation international forum used for negotiating treaties related to arms control and disarmament, started formal negotiations on the CTBT in 1994. The CTBT is amongst the longest looked for and hardest battled for arms control deal ever, and it aims at banning all nuclear testing. In 1958 initial negotiations started between the US, UK, and USSR; these negotiations proceeded throughout the 1970s and 80s, leading to the closing of talks on CTBT in September 1996. The settlement faced a stalemate on two principal goals: it makes it hard for states with cutting-edge atomic weapons projects to foster new sorts of atomic warheads, and it makes it undeniably more convoluted for countries competing to foster these weapons to test-evidence their effectiveness. 

After the CTBT was concluded, Pakistan actively engaged at the platform; on the other hand, India protested when the deal was presented in UN General Assembly for endorsement. It is interesting to note that India declined to sign CTBT after it was opened for signature in 1996. The CTBT has not entered into force yet, as nine more states need to ratify and after initial signatures. Pakistan, India, and North Korea have not signed the CTBT (CTBTO, n.d.). Pakistan has consistently sought after the possibility of atomic limitation forcefully at the global and provincial levels, has an official position on the CTBT is that it will only sign the treaty if and when India will sign it (Sultan, 2018; Altaf, 2016). 

Pakistan is among the nations that have been actively participated in achieving the global nuclear disarmament ideals. The CTBT is a significant advance in acknowledging an efficient cycle to accomplish atomic disarmament. By joining the CTBT, nations (not possessing atomic weapons) enter into a lawfully restricting responsibility that seriously compels their capacity to foster functional atomic warheads. 

Notwithstanding, since the last decade, the security climate in the region has deteriorated; consequently, Pakistan would not endanger its national security interests by signing the CTBT without acquiring plausible validations regarding the signature from India and other states. President Obama had additionally shown that he would urge India and Pakistan to sanction the deal and resolve the Kashmir issue to lessen atomic perils in South Asia. Subsequently, the US will probably focus on its political endeavors with India and Pakistan to urge them to move past their ban on atomic testing. However, Pakistan is still not willing to sign CTBT before India as it is believed to be counterproductive for the balance of power and deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistan might feel comfortable signing the CTBT in the future after it has confidence that it has developed the specialized capacity to test atomic weapons at a high level through conducting atomic tests.

The issue regarding CTBT is that the benefits for Pakistan are almost nonexistent, and the international obligations it will in case of signing the CTBT are huge. The world has moved into a time in which the role of nuclear weapons has again been stressed upon. The revivalism of nuclear weapons across the globe is linked with the modernization of nuclear arsenals and the procurement of new technology. In such an international environment, unilateral signing of CTBT will be disadvantageous for Pakistan. 




The Export Control Regimes (ECRs) and Pakistan 

Pakistan has expressed the desire to become part of all four export control regimes without compromising its status as a nuclear power, nuclear posture, or accepting any conditions placed on its nuclear weapon program (Jaspal, 2015). These regimes include the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassanar Arrangement (WA), Missile Technology Control Group (MTCR), and Australia Group (AG). Pakistan currently is not a member of any of the export control regimes. Only MTCR and NSG will be discussed in detail the AG and WA do not fall under the scope of this paper. This is because the Australia Group deals with biological and chemical weapons exports, and the Wassanar Arrangement deals with controlling the export of conventional weapons and related items. 




Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 

MTCR is a casual gathering of 35 nations that was created in 1987. It aims to forestall missile multiplication by deliberately adhering to basic fare strategy rules identified with missile and missile advances (SECDIV, 2018). The MTCR demands the members be surveyed on numerous contemplations which incorporate commitments that another part will make to reinforce worldwide restraint efforts. Also, the supportable responsibility is legitimately based on a compelling fare control framework and techniques that successfully oversee and implement these controls (MTCR Trade info, n.d.). 

Regardless of its exceptional interest in export control regimes, Pakistan has not shown any interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It has voluntarily adhered to the MTCR guidelines (Dawn, 2016). Pakistan has adequately progressed its missile program and has an additional number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles (Davenport, 2021). At the same time, Pakistan has never looked to become a member of MTCR, which basically could give more assistance to Pakistan's already established missile technologies. The policymakers in Pakistan think that it is not favorable for applying as Pakistan is willfully following the rules of MTCR. 

While India got the MTCR membership in June 2016 (The Hindu, 2016), it is unlikely that Pakistan and China will get the membership as this group works on consensus. China has applied for the MTCR membership in 2004, but the MTCR members have not reached a consensus on making China a member.

Pakistan meets the whole MTCR guidelines, although there are other inferred factors in play that are forestalling Pakistan to join the MTCR. The MTCR is a voluntary system with no lawfully restricting responsibilities or punishment for violators. MTCR urges its members to confine their prices of missiles and related innovation fit for conveying a 500 kg payload for in any event 300 km or conveying any weapon of mass annihilation (MTCR Guidelines, n.d.). 

Pakistan is facing the challenge of Indian collaboration in missile technologies with Russia and Israel. The membership might be linked to prestige, but becoming a member means getting access to information and technologies that can be fruitful in the advanced missile program. 

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The NSG is known as a voluntary multilateral export control cartel, i.e., it is a group of nuclear supplier nations that follow the agenda that the nuclear materials, equipment, and technology if and when supplied to the non-nuclear states should be monitored so that it is not used for making nuclear weapons (NSG, n.d.). 

Pakistan applied for the NSG participation after India applied for the NSG membership in 2016. 

Pakistan applied for the NSG membership in May 2016. Pakistan applied for enrollment after Turkey and China supported it. The US has not openly gone against Pakistan for applying for the NSG membership; the US States Department's representative, Imprint Toner, in 2016 remarked that any nation could present the application for participation. However, the participants would be considered on an agreement choice (Stewart & Sultan, 2019). NSG had started negotiations over the "specialized, lawful, and political parts of support of non-NPT states in the NSG" in the Seoul Plenary in June 2017 (NSG plenary meeting, 2017). China has obstructed India's entrance into the NSG more than once. China has taken up a position at the NSG forum that if India is permitted to join the NSG without signing the NPT, then, at that point, Pakistan should also be allowed to become a member of NSG.

In 2004 Pakistan sanctioned Export Control Act on products, innovations, materials, and technology identified with Nuclear and organic weapons and their conveyance frameworks (SECDV, 2017). On March 26, 2018, the US highlighted seven Pakistani firms that posed a threat to the US national security and interests, and this could be a colossal hit on Pakistan's desire for NSG membership (Iqbal, 2018). 

Presently the NSG rules preclude atomic fares by all significant providers to Pakistan with almost no exceptional cases since it is said that Pakistan does not have full-scope IAEA safeguards on the entirety of its atomic exercises. Pakistan has projected round to arrive at an understanding with the NSG members like India, which was given a particular IAEA additional protocol to favor the United States and other NSG members. The explanation that surfaces most of the time regarding why Pakistan has not got special favors like India was given, i.e., the Indo-US nuclear deal or a special NSG wavier, is that Pakistan's weak proliferation record (Jamal, 2015) makes it challenging for the US or another nuclear supplier state to offer a nuclear deal to Pakistan. The AQ. Khan linkage to the nuclear black market has strained Pakistan's reputation and has badly reflected on the state of Pakistan. 




Conclusion and Recommendations - NNPR and Pakistan

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime has successfully stopped the spread of nuclear weapons globally, but it has been less effective in curbing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

According to the recent statement given by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Sohail Mehmood, at the Conference of Disarmament (CD), Pakistan's biggest concern is that the rules and procedures of the global nonproliferation regime have been side-stepped to accommodate a few states (MOFA, 2021). An example can be given of India, an exception in the export control regimes. India was admitted as a member of the MTCR in June 2016, while other major powers such as China's application have still been accepted. The other favor bestowed upon India was the NSG wavier (2008), which allowed it to involve in the trade of nuclear technology. It is interesting to note that the NSG revised guidelines prohibit non-NPT states from accessing reprocessing and enrichment technologies (Akbar & Riaz, 2020).

It is keeping the discriminatory approach followed by the ECRs apart. The biggest challenge Pakistan faces regarding the ECRs is the uncertainty of taking the initiative or getting into an agreement or an export control cartel. Pakistan has shown interest in only becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The rest of the three ECRs, i.e., WA, AG, and MTCR, are not seen as appropriate to be joined by the policymakers. Pakistan wants to get into the NSG because it wants to become a legitimate nuclear weapon state like India. 

When it comes to becoming a part of the NNPR and getting recognized as a nuclear power, lobbying at the various international forums for voicing Pakistan's apprehensions about the effective functioning of NNPR is the key towards improving Pakistan's image and credibility as a nuclear-capable state.  




Table 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and Pakistan
Treaty/ Arrangement	Pakistan’s Position	Challenges	Recommendations
NPT (1970)	Wants to join as a nuclear state, i.e., without giving up its nuclear power status.	·   The states that have given up nuclear weapon programs like South Africa to the cause and ideals behind creating the NPT.	The NPT needs to adopt an inclusive approach for reaching the universal level; it is time that the NPT members should provide Pakistan with a quid pro quo approach viz a viz the NSG membership. Another option can be that Pakistan is offered to sign NPT as a nuclear possessor state, and it will keep the prestige factor intact and strengthen the NPT. Another scenario can be that Pakistan remains outside of the NPT and maintains the status quo.
FMCT	Wants a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) rather than FMCT. This FMT must ban the future production and the existing stockpile of all the nuclear states.	·   The treaty draft has not been finalized yet, and the negotiations process is yet to conclude.	Pakistan can go for an FMCT rather than demanding an FMT, and this will provide it with an upper hand, and Pakistan can fix the scope of the FMCT with like-minded states. Pakistan should stop blocking the negotiations on the FMCT, which will put pressure on India and other states hiding behind Pakistan's shadow.
CTBT	Pakistan will not be the first to recommence testing of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region, and it will not sign CTBT until India signs.	·   The US and China (CTBTO, n.d.) have only signed; the ratification is still due. CTBT requires ratification of at least 34 states to be functional, i.e., its entry into force. ·   The onus of responsibility is on the major powers such as the US and China to ratify the CTBT. They are unwilling to do so soon, which indicates that the era of nuclear testing has not ended yet. ·   If Pakistan unilaterally signs and ratify this would be counterproductive for the national security interests of Pakistans and will destabilize the balance of power in the region.	India and Pakistan can join the CTBT mutually, guaranteeing both states that nuclear testing in South Asia will not take place. In a hypothetical scenario, if Pakistan signs the CTBT unilaterally, it will shift the pressure on India. The example can be given of the signature and ratification by Russia that has put on much pressure on the US. Pakistan can sign but hold the ratification. This will shift India's focus and elevate Pakistan's international stature as a responsible nuclear-capable state.
NSG	She wants to become a member. Has applied for the NSG membership in June 2016.	·   The membership and working of this group have been politically motivated. ·   Economic interest surpasses the ideal nonproliferation approach. ·   Indian lobby is strong enough; if it gets into the NSG first, Pakistan's prospects are significantly less.	Pakistan needs to have a clear roadmap regarding what it wants to achieve by becoming an NSG member. Another significant question is what Pakistan can offer to the NSG community to motivate them to give Pakistan the NSG membership. Pakistan should invest in making its lobbying strong at the international level to gain NSG membership.  Pakistan could focus on getting the membership of AG, WA, and MTCR first; by doing this, the chances of sitting with the states that are a part of NSG and that can support Pakistan's case for the NSG membership will increase.
MTCR	She does not want to become a member.	·   India got the MTCR membership in June 2016. ·   India will get access to advanced missile technologies and be involved in importing and exporting these technologies across the globe.	India has joined the MTCR as a member, while China has awaited its membership request since 2004, proving that the membership to this cartel is politically motivated. Pakistan has not shown any interest in joining the MTCR because it possesses indigenous missile capability, which has proved sufficient to serve its national security interests. Over getting the MTCR membership, it would be better if Pakistan maintains its current position and engages with the MTCR via outreach meetings like it did in 2018.

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