Abstract

India and Pakistan have been changing their military doctrines at a faster pace. Indians had been since long focused on the policy of preparing them to fight a full-fledged conventional war against Pakistan. It was the nuclearization of Pakistan that forced them to bring change into Indian military doctrine and focus on a limited war than a full-fledged one. This Indian military tilt pressurized Pakistan to fill the gap at the tactical by introducing low yield nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Furthermore, Indians being restricted to initiate limited war against Pakistan opted for the options of surgical strike and, when failed to gain the desired efforts against Pakistan, opted for airstrikes in 2019, which resulted in a severe crisis. There is still a lot to come in future and bring further changes into the military doctrines of the two countries. This qualitative research gives a detailed discussion on the changing military doctrine of India and Pakistan, adding the views of expert informants.

Key Words

India, Pakistan, Limited War, Low Yield Nuclear Weapons, Surgical Strikes, Air Strikes

Introduction

After the dismemberment of Pakistan into two parts, the realization emerged on Pakistan’s side that it should bring change into its traditional military doctrine and opt for the options which are essential for strengthening its defense and providing it with security against any future Indian adventure. It was the results of the 1971 war that led Pakistan on the way of nuclearization. Pakistan became successful in getting nuclear weapons technology in the 1980s and started challenging Indian conventional military superiority. Indians realizing the fact of change in the South Asian military status quo, started preparing for the limited war in 2004. It was now Pakistan’s turn to take steps to face this new Indian challenge, and it decided to manufacture low yield nuclear weapons to challenge the Indian option of limited war. India, being restricted to initiate limited war, opted for surgical and airstrikes. There is still a lot to come in this episode of military changes of the two countries. This article gives a comprehensive look into the two countries’ doctrines.


Highlighting the Gap Which Paved the Way for Low Yield Nuclear Weapons
When Pakistan saw that there is a gap at the tactical level where Indians wanted to benefit by launching a limited conventional war against it under their Cold Start Doctrine, it started working to fill that gap at the tactical level with the manufacturing of low yield nuclear weapons. In this connection, Kidwai argued that the development of Pakistan’s low yield nuclear weapons and test of NASR short-range missile created a serious roadblock in the way of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine and further highlighted the disastrous effect of low yield nuclear weapons:
Here is a weapon system which is very powerful, very lethal, multi-barrel, and it can easily pick out one, two, three or any number of battle groups at the very outset, so this in our thinking has basically filled a gap as we now call a “Full Spectrum Deterrence” and now this term of “Full Spectrum Deterrence” means that we had the strategic weapons and we have improved them, we had operational weapons and we have improved them, and now we have made tactical weapons (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015).
The above said words of Kidwai meant that Pakistan has become successful in achieving “Full Spectrum Deterrence”, where it has improved its strategic nuclear weapons, have got the operationalized capability and developed low yield nuclear weapons which could cause massive destruction on the enemy side.
India and Pakistan have been involved in four crises before the advent of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine in 2004, which paved the way for the development of Pakistan’s low yield nuclear weapons. While looking at the first crisis between India and Pakistan after getting the nuclear capabilities during the 1986-87 crisis, it becomes very visible that India at that point was willing to go for an attack on Pakistan. Though the two states have not tested their nuclear weapons, the two sides knew about their nuclear weapons capabilities. Although India started the military exercise with the name “Brasstacks” and was willing to go for an attack on Pakistan at the last moment decided not to attack Pakistan because of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, but the mobilization on the Indian side was meant that Indians were still willing for a conventional war under the nuclear umbrella and it indicated to the gap which was present at the tactical level, and that was giving confidence to India to go for a conventional war.
The second crisis between the two states occurred in 1990 when the two states started threatening each other after the height of the insurgency in Kashmir. Though the politicians on the two sides started threatening each other with conventional war, if we looked closely at the crisis, we did not experience war mobilization on the two sides. Indians have been claiming space for conventional war under the nuclear umbrella, which motivated them to threaten Pakistan of war consequences. The third Indo-Pak crisis was the Kargil conflict which was initiated by Pakistan and affirmed an Indian viewpoint that there is space for the conventional conflict and the conventional war between the two nuclear-weapon states. Indians became successful in taking control of the Kargil heights; otherwise, they would have started a full-fledged conventional war against Pakistan.
The fourth crisis between the two countries occurred in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. India started military mobilization and decided to go for a conventional war against Pakistan, but it was the longer mobilization period that provided space for international diplomacy, and therefore, the United States pressure stopped India from attacking Pakistan. In the meantime, Pakistan also counters mobilized. This was the turning point in India’s military history where India tried to recognize the loopholes in its strategy. India knew that space for the conventional war was there, but the fault line lay in the Indian military strategy because it was not utilizing that space in the proper way. Indians finally announced the new strategy with the name “Cold Start Doctrine” in 2004, and they changed the old method of war tactic from “mobilize and attack” to the new method of warfare with the strategy of “attack and mobilize”. They continuously started their different exercises. If the time period between 1986-87 and 2001-02 is closely looked at, the four Indo-Pak crises can be noticed, the space for the conventional war seems to be visible, which led the two states to indulge in crisis one after another. And it was the only reason that when Pakistan recognized this gap, it put all its efforts to manufacture low yield nuclear weapons as soon as possible to counter the Indian Cold Start Doctrine.

Why Indians Pursued Cold Start Doctrine?

Indian Cold Start Doctrine basically showed a shift from defensive orientation, which the Indian military was following since 1947. Former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes described Indian Defensive Posture in such a way: “a non-aggressive, non-provocative defense policy based on the philosophy of defensive defense” (Ladwig III 2008: 158). India followed a Sundarji doctrine from 1981 to 2004 in which seven defensives “holding corps” of the Indian army were deployed near Pakistan’s border. Ladwig III further said:

The units consisted of infantry divisions for static defense, mobile mechanized divisions that could respond to enemy penetrations, and a small number of armoured units. Although possessing limited offensive power, as their name implies, the holding corps’ primary role during a war was to check an enemy advance (Ladwig III 2008: 159).

Under Cold Start Doctrine, armed forces, with the help of the Indian Air force, will conduct quick and sharp military action against an adversary in the shape of a limited conventional war. Cold Start gives India leverage over Pakistan in conventional military strength (Ladwig III 2008). Pakistan’s Ex Ambassador Akram Zaki said while discussing on Indian Cold Start Doctrine, “Ajeet Doval and V.K Singh, they have a new theory of aggressive defense that enter the territory of the enemy and destroy its capacity, so they are undermining our (Pakistanis) capacity” (Zaki, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 11 November 2015).

Indians have tried to go for a conventional war against Pakistan since the 1986-87 crisis, but it failed to do so because of its longer mobilization period that left Pakistan with no element of surprise. Indians knew that there was space for the conventional war between the two countries but failed to utilize that space in the proper way. Indo-Pak 2001-02 crisis seemed to be a turning point in Indian military history as it proved Indian military strategy flawed as Indian strategists now onwards started working on the new options to tackle this issue of the longer mobilization period. Indians finally came up with a proposal of the Cold Start Doctrine, which basically meant to change the old strategy into the new one from “mobilize and attack” to the new method of “attack and mobilize.” India has conducted many exercises of the Cold Start Doctrine since its starting in 2004.

When India saw that it could not do anything to Pakistan in the Kargil conflict in 1999 or in Indo-Pak 2001-02 crisis, then Indians started thinking about how to deal with Pakistan. Indians, after research, reached a point that Pakistan can be targeted with limited war as it will not allow Pakistan to use strategic nuclear weapons against India. Therefore, Indians initiated Cold Start Doctrine in 2004, which meant to deploy five to eight Independent Battle Groups (IBGs) on the international border against Pakistan within 72 to 96 hours. These IBGs will be given a task to attack Pakistan, and in the meantime, India will have time to mobilize its forces (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Kidwai further said that the Indian Cold Start Doctrine is basically a turnaround from General Sundarjee Doctrine, which stated, “Mobilize and Hit,” while this new doctrine basically narrated, “Hit and Mobilize”, so this is the difference between these two Indian doctrines.  Furthermore, Kidwai added, “They (Indians) have tried to create Independent Battle Groups (IBGs), about a division size force, armoured brigades and a bit of mechanized size of infantry, so they said, they will strike at eight points within 72 to 96 hours” (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Indians thought that Pakistan has strategic nuclear weapons with large yield and long-range, and it cannot use it in limited war (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Kidwai further added:

This was the gap at the tactical level, operational level; I (Kidwai) think, in my opinion, creating an incentive for them (Indians) to plan this kind of doctrine to overcome this mobilization business, to overcome this mental conflict of not having been neutralized despite the nuclear capacity of Pakistan, so they developed this Cold Start Doctrine behind that theme (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015).

Indians think that this doctrine can fulfil their interests in a better way as they can initiate war against Pakistan within 72 to 96 hours and achieve the objective of putting major losses on Pakistan and stop the war within few days and not allow Pakistan to cross the red lines and think about the nuclear attack. According to Indians, they have the capability and experience to fight a limited conventional war under the nuclear umbrella. They also believe that Pakistan will not opt for the nuclear strike against India because it knows that India is also a nuclear weapon state, and it is not so easy to attack another nuclear weapon state which can destroy the whole of Pakistan.

The time for the test of the Cold Start Doctrine came when a crisis occurred between India and Pakistan after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008, but it was witnessed that though the hype was created in India for a war against Pakistan, but India did not operationalize the Cold Start Doctrine and opt for limited war. Indian Cold Start Doctrine was in an experimental phase in the 2008 crisis, and that was the reason that Indians did not opt for the option of war against Pakistan. 

Pakistan’s Response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine

When Pakistan recognized the gap at the tactical level, it started developing the NASR missile system and went for manufacturing of low yield nuclear weapons. This weapon system is “very powerful, very lethal, multi-barrel, and it can easily pick out one, two, three or any number of battle groups”, and it has successfully filled the gap at the tactical level. Pakistan has now gone for “Full Spectrum Deterrence”, which means “we had the strategic weapons and we have improved them, we had operational weapons and we have improved them and now we have made tactical weapons” (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Kidwai further added:

We (Pakistanis) introduced tactical weapons because India has brought battle down to the tactical level. If they haven’t brought the battle from the strategic level to the tactical level and they had not been obsessed with this concept of finding space for conventional war despite Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Perhaps, Pakistan may not have been gone for tactical weapons (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015).

Indians have compressed time and space in connection to their newly invented Cold Start Doctrine, and that led Pakistan with no other option but to threaten India with the use of low yield nuclear weapons. Pakistan cannot rely on intent because when Indians are prepared for war, it will take only one second to decide and initiate the attack, and with Indian decision to revise its conventional military doctrine by lowering the conventional threshold at the tactical level, it disturbed the whole series in which “Indians have compressed the time, space and the relative strength material” (Kidwai, Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Pakistan’s low yield nuclear weapons are meant to deter India and do not have a purpose to be used in war. India blames Pakistan for demonstrating the use of low yield nuclear weapons in war; in response, “Pakistan argued that if India imposes battle on Pakistan, then we have right to use these weapons against India” (Kidwai, Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Pakistan’s response by creating the option of low yield nuclear weapons and delivery systems which you need to know are not deployed, but the fact that we have that capability has made them rethink, so in that sense, the low yield nuclear weapons have played the deterrence role (Akram, Expert Informant, Interview, 14 November 2015).

When Pakistan recognized the gap that India wanted to take benefit of at the tactical level, it started working to fill that gap by manufacturing the low yield nuclear weapons, which are so lethal, destructive that they can take away three, four, five or any number of IBGs (Independent Battle Groups). Pakistan tested its short-range NASR missile with the capability of carrying low yield nuclear weapons, and this test provided the message to India that it cannot take Pakistan for granted. The efforts to manufacture low yield nuclear weapons on Pakistan’s side continued for so many years, and finally, it became successful in getting the capability and manufacturing the low yield nuclear weapons. Pakistan claimed that the Indian Cold Start Doctrine has dangerous consequences because of its short time period to start a war against it. Pakistan argued that the earlier Indian strategy of ‘mobilize and attack’ has been changed with the new strategy of ‘attack and mobilize’ and this created a serious threat perception on Pakistan’s side.

Pakistan has opted for the position that while India has situated different IBGs (Independent Battle Groups) on its border with Pakistan, which are empowered to initiate war against Pakistan within 72 hours, it will not allow Indians to fight a war on its soil and it will take all steps to take Indian forces out of its territory including the use of low yield nuclear weapons which can take away four, five or any number of IBGs (Independent Battle Groups). This Pakistani position has made the situation critical.




Indian Response to Pakistan’s Low Yield Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan’s leadership has given clear signals that low yield nuclear weapons have a vital role in Pakistan’s strategic policy. Pakistan’s policy of lowering the nuclear threshold has the basic purpose of stopping India from launching any conventional strike against it. India has responded Pakistan with a counter-threat. Indians argued that if Pakistan uses low yield nuclear weapons on its troops, whether on Indian or Pakistan’s territory in limited conventional war that will be considered as a nuclear attack on India and it reserves the right to respond with the counter nuclear strikes on Pakistan. This categorical statement on Indian side has made the situation critical. In this connection, Biswas (2015) added that India needed to revisit its doctrine or create options to tackle Pakistan’s low yield nuclear weapons threat. While supporting Pakistan’s decision to opt for low yield nuclear weapons, Khan, Z said that Pakistan’s “low yield nuclear weapons have effectively deterred India to operationalize its Cold Start Doctrine” against it (Expert Informant, Interview, 12 November 2015). It is argued that after Pakistan’s threat of the use of low yield nuclear weapons, Indians have tried to look for other options as surgical strikes against Pakistan other than the option of limited war.

Pakistan’s Survival and Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan has been able to deter India for the larger context, to be subdued and weakened at the hands of India. Pakistan has the only option of nuclear deterrence which has made it secure against Indian threat of full-fledged or limited conventional war. There is no possibility of India going for a conventional war against Pakistan. Pakistan has more than enough nuclear weapons, which can make India unlivable and that has forced India to adopt a restraint. Although Indians also have the same nuclear weapons capacity which can make Pakistan unlivable it seems almost impossible for them to initiate conventional war because of the fear of nuclear escalation.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have filled the gap of Indo-Pak conventional military asymmetry and created restraint on the Indian side. Nuclear deterrence have been given credit for bringing strategic stability in the region as it averted conventional war, either full-fledged or limited. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons either strategic or tactical have proved to be a roadblock in the way of Indian intention of full-fledged or limited conventional war against it. In this connection, Kidwai argued that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are India centric as it believes that in the presence of nuclear weapons India will not dare to go for any adventure against it (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). Furthermore, Akram defends Kidwai’s position and argues that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been a guarantee for its security as the nuclear deterrence has averted conventional war between India and Pakistan and it is the nuclear deterrence that brings the United States role in diffusing tension in times of crises between the two countries. (Expert Informant, Interview, 14 November 2015).

In this connection, Cheema, Z,I confirmed the viewpoint of Kidwai and Akram as he argued that without any doubt, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have provided it security against Indian conventional military threat as Pakistan became able to test these devices in 1983 and from 1983 upto this stage, it have been able to avert war and to address any kind of conventional war and able to totally avert the existence of the total war and to somehow preserve peace but fragile peace as the nuclear deterrence did not preserve and secure permanent peace in South Asia (Cheema, Z.I, Expert Informant, 13 November 2015). Furthermore, Jaspal argued that the nuclear weapons have played a significant role in Pakistan’s defensive policy and Indo-Pak deterrence calculations basically comes under Security Insecurity Paradox as Pakistan’s strategic weapons have stopped total war in the region while its low yield nuclear weapons have blocked Indian intention of launching limited conventional war against Pakistan (Jaspal, Z, N., Expert Informant, Interview, 13 November 2015).

Pakistan’s inferiority in conventional military capability has made it more dependent on nuclear weapons. It is basically based on providing it a security against India and not for the cause of producing aggression against India. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is a war prevention doctrine and not a war fighting doctrine and it is more or less the same position as West and NATO had in Europe as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have ensured its survival as state as it prevents any Indian adventure against it because Indians had been busy in searching space for conventional war against Pakistan and that is why they Initiated Cold Start Doctrine (Limited War Doctrine) which was successfully blocked by Pakistan with its low yield nuclear weapons. Indians are still busy in strengthening their conventional military capability and investing a huge amount on it and that brings concern on Pakistan’s side and makes it more dependent on its nuclear weapons for its security (Zaki, Expert Informant, 11 November 2015). In this connection, Cheema, Z.I argued that it is not possible to have easy victories in the nuclear environment because of unaffordable destruction on the two sides and this psychological effect of nuclear deterrence stops states from pursuing the path of war (Expert Informant, 13 November 2015). Indian willingness to go for a limited war against Pakistan is not going to work because if India does that then Pakistan will surely respond to it with its own way as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to provide it security against India, and therefore Pakistan will not hesitate to use it if it faces a threat to its security from Indian initiated war (Cheema, Z.I, Expert Informant, 13 November 2015).

Although it was Pakistan’s mistake to initiate the Kargil conflict in 1999, which gave Indians the opportunity to give argument in favour of space for conventional conflict under nuclear umbrella as one of Ex-Indian Army Chief said that look there is a space for conventional conflict or war which has motivated Pakistan to initiate Kargil conflict against India. It was the Kargil conflict which later gave justification to India to initiate Cold Start Doctrine with the purpose of fighting a limited conventional war under nuclear environment. Pakistan countered “Indian Cold Start Doctrine” with manufacturing “low yield nuclear weapons” and had achieved “Full Spectrum Deterrence” and in this environment; Indians cannot launch a limited war, capture small territory and declare the end of the war, it will have a response and in response, Pakistan has choices either to go conventional or nuclear (Abbas, Expert Informant, 2 November 2015).

Although India still wants to go for military action against Pakistan but it has been noticed that the strategic stability has prevailed as Indians are not in a position to launch a conventional war against Pakistan under nuclear umbrella. Indians still have a limited war concept in their minds and they can think of launching surgical strikes or air strikes against Pakistan under Cold Start Doctrine. Any such Indian surgical strikes or airstrikes would bring Pakistan military’s response to it and that situation can plunge into war which can also cross the threshold (Mirza, N., Expert Informant, 9 November 2015). India and Pakistan faced many crisis including Kargil conflict but so far neither war has broken out between India and Pakistan nor there is a complete breakdown of deterrence which suggests that there is a fragile stability, ugly stability, precarious stability or a weak stability but stability is there and that has preserved restraint on the two sides not to go for a conventional war (Cheema, Z.I, Expert Informant, 13 November 2015).

Pakistan’s security infrastructure has now become completely dependent on its nuclear arsenals because Pakistan admits the fact that it cannot match Indians in conventional military capabilities. The increased gap in conventional capabilities between India and Pakistan has resulted in Pakistan’s more dependence on nuclear weapons for its security. Lieutenant General (R) Pakistan Army, Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said while justifying the presence of nuclear weapons being contributory in Pakistan’s defense, “we (Pakistanis) are a nuclear power; you (Indians) can’t do anything to us (Pakistanis) because you cannot dare to fight us in presence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and if you want to go with the same immature attitude, go on, we (Pakistanis) are ready to face you” (Kidwai, K, A., Expert Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015). In this connection, Das argued that Pakistan’s inferiority in conventional military capabilities makes it more dependent on nuclear weapons and furthermore, Pakistan’s “Full Spectrum Deterrence” has made it capable to bring restraint on India side that India could not initiate full-fledged or limited conventional war against it (Das, P., Expert Informant, Email Interview, 9 February 2016). Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have helped it to balance Indian conventional military superiority (Nye, Expert Informant, Email Interview, 9 February 2016). The two states are involved in the relationship of balance of terror, and no one of the two wants to disturb the deterrence equation present in the region (Marwah, Expert Informant, Email Interview, 25 January 2016).

More reliance on nuclear weapons is also dangerous because it leaves the state with no other option but to go nuclear in a conventional war. Pakistan’s introduction of low yield nuclear weapons in response to the Indian Cold Start Doctrine is one of its proofs. While India brings changes in conventional military doctrine, Pakistan responds by bringing changes in its nuclear doctrine. India goes ahead to cover the loopholes in the conventional field and lowers its conventional thresholds, while Pakistan responds by lowering the threshold by developing low yield nuclear weapons. This competition has resulted in a dangerous situation where one side wants to have space for conventional war in any case; the other side decides to stop any aggression with all its resources, either conventional or nuclear.

Conclusion

India and Pakistan’s military doctrines started shifting from conventional to nuclear postures as the two states opted for nuclearization. The two states’ nuclearization brought a new change in their military doctrines, and it was nuclear deterrence that stopped India and Pakistan from fighting a full-fledged conventional war. Being restricted to initiate a full-fledged conventional war, Indians opted for a limited war option by introducing Cold Start Doctrine. This Indian policy created a new threat for Pakistan which forced it to fulfil the gap at the tactical level and manufacture low yield nuclear weapons. The hurdle of Pakistan’s low yield nuclear weapons forced Indian to opt for surgical and air strikes against Pakistan, which failed to get its expected results. Pakistan has effectively stopped the Indian aggressive posture both at conventional and nuclear layors. India’s huge investment in conventional military modernization brings a major challenge for Pakistan, which needs to be taken seriously by Pakistani decision-makers. South Asian nuclear weapon states have still to see more competition at conventional layor in the coming days.

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